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Abstract
This paper studies the labor market in Vietnam during the transition towards market
economy (1993-2006): we show that the public-private sector wage gap markedly in-
creased, but that wage inequality decreased overall. Our aim is to assess how much
of this evolution can be explained by workers’ productive skills and their allocation
between sectors. We use a simple, yet innovative, method that allows us to take into
account workers’ unobservable characteristics and their remuneration in each sector.
Throughout the period we consider, workers are more skilled than private sector work-
ers. However, rising returns to workers’ skills in the public sector play a major role in
the increase of the public-private sector gap. Against all expectations, the public sector
grew richer as Vietnam moved towards market economy. Finally, a greater homo-
geneity among labor market participants seems to explain the overall decline in wage
inequality.
JEL classification codes: J45, J31, P31
1 Introduction
Does the transition towards a market economy lead to higher earnings inequality on
the labor market? The answer crucially depends on the context in which the transition
occurs and on the policies that shape the way it unfolds. In Poland for example Keane
and Prasad (2006) showed that the transition increased earnings inequality because
the public and the private sectors both adopted a "competitive" wage setting, where
workers’ pay is more closely related to their productivity. The difference in earnings
between the public and the private sector increased because the less productive em-
ployees moved from the public to the private sector. A quick look at Table 2 shows that
Vietnam seem to have followed a different path: between-sector inequality indeed rose
but within-sector inequality declined.
Of course Vietnam differs in many respects from the well-studied Eastern European
countries. First, the private wage sector is much less developed, because the work
*I wish to thank Abhijit Banerjee, François Bourguignon, Gary Fields, Thomas Lemieux, Martin Rama,
Martin Ravallion and Dominique Van de Walle for helpful comments. I am grateful to Bryan Mac Caig for
sharing his codes on the VHLSS panels, and to Marc Gurgand for his patient supervision.
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force is massively engaged in self-employed activities, both in urban and rural areas.
Second, the Communist party Congress of 2001 decided against the drastic privatiza-
tion agenda proposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the
aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis (Painter 2005). Ideological considerations were
important in this decision. But the dramatic reorganization of public enterprises in
"General Companies" indicates that the public sector was entrusted with a leading role
in Vietnam’s development strategy (Eglinger 2005). In this sense Vietnam’s transition
towards market economy closer to China’s (Iyigun & Rodrik 2004).
This paper focuses on public-private sectors differences, and identifies the effect of
public sector reform on labor earnings inequality. From the literature on public sector
labor markets, one could support two very different views. On the one hand, if there is a
fixed "public sector premium" given to workers independently of their productive char-
acteristics, public-private differences are inequality-increasing. A reform that would
make public sector pay similar to a competitive wage setting would hence reduce in-
equality (Bales and Rama 2001). On the other hand if the public sector wage setting
dampens inequality between skilled and unskilled workers (Disney Gosling 1998), and
given that public sector workers are on average more skilled, then a public sector re-
form could increase inequality (Keane and Prasad 2006)1.
However, in order to identify the effect of changes in the wage setting, one has to con-
trol for compositional effects, because workers have different skills in the two sectors2.
These skills could be observed (diploma, experience) or unobserved (cognitive skills,
communication skills). This motivates the use of a new model with unobserved work-
ers’ heterogeneity and different returns to skills in two employment sectors. The model
was initially developed by Lemieux (1998) to investigate the causes of the union-non
union sector wage gap3. This model allows us to simulate counterfactual wage distri-
butions that show separately the effect of selection (differences in workers’ character-
istics), and the effect of wage setting policies (differences in returns to these character-
istics).
Using two panels from the Vietnam Health and Living Standard Survey (1993-2006),
we show that the public-private hourly earnings gap increased dramatically between
the 1990s and the following decade, while within sector inequality decreased in both
sectors. In line with the rest of the literature, we find that selection is a major compo-
nent of inter-sector differences: public employees are better paid because they are more
skilled than their private counterparts. But we show that changes in between-sectors
wage inequality are mostly explained by rising returns to workers’ skills in the public
as compared to the private sector. Initially underpaid as compared to private sector
workers - other things being equal -, public employees now enjoy much higher returns
to their productive characteristics. These institutional changes were offset by a de-
crease in workers’ heterogeneity on the labor market so that wage inequality decreased
overall.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the section 2, we delimit our sample and doc-
ument the fact that the private-public wage gap increased between the 1990s and the
2000s, while overall wage inequality decreased. In section 3, we present our model. In
section 4, we present our results, and compare them to those of other methods which
1Liu (2004) has the same line of argument regarding the gender wage gap in Vietnam, which is lower in the
public sector. The author is concerned that a shrinking public sector would lead to higher gender inequality.
2The literature on developing countries typically finds large public private pay gaps that are mostly explained
by selection (see for example Van der Gaag and Vijverberg 1988, Glinskaya and Lokshin 2005).
3Suri (Forthcoming) uses a similar model to study the effect of selection and comparative advantage in the
adoption of fertilizers in rural Kenya.
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are commonly used to decompose wage inequality. In section 5, we draw counterfac-
tual distributions to decompose the public-private earnings gap at each period, and the
overall change in wage inequality across periods.
2 Rising public/private earnings differences
2.1 Data
The data we use come from the national representative surveys Vietnam Living Stan-
dard Surveys VLSS (1993 and 1998) and Vietnam Health and Living Standard Surveys
VHLSS (2002, 2004 and 2006). Except for 2002, they have been carried out by the
General Statistical Office (GSO) in partnership with the World Bank. The strength of
this dataset is its panel dimension. We can rely on three panels of two observations
each: 1993-1998, 2002-2004 and 2004-2006. Changes in survey methodology and
sample do not allow households to be tracked throughout the 1993-2006 period. Even
if the 2002, 2004 and 2006 are included in the same panel, it rotated in 2004, so that
a very small fraction of the households on which we have data in 2002 and 2004 is
still present in 2006. For purposes of analysis, we will construct a 2002-2006 panel by
simply pooling the two 2002-2004 and 2004-2006 panels, ignoring the fact that some
households have been interviewed in 2002, 2004 and 20064.
The VLSS and the VHLSS are representative of the whole country on a given year,
provided we use the appropriate sample weights. In every second year of the two years
panels, an additional sample is drawn to compensate selective attrition from the panel
and adapt to changing demographics of the total population. Since our analysis focuses
on the panel sample, selective attrition can threaten its internal validity. In particular,
private-public sectors comparison could be biased if private sector workers are less
stable geographically than public employees5. We will discuss this problem whenever
there is a possibility that it may bias our results. However, we do not find any sig-
nificant difference in observable workers’ characteristics nor in public-private sector
shares between the cross-sectional and the panel sample. More importantly, the wage
distributions are perfectly similar.
2.2 Public and Private employment
While the focus of our study is on wage and wage related benefits, only a small share
of the labor force in Vietnam is actually working for wage. In the early 1990s out of
five workers only one was employed for her main occupation outside of her household,
and this share is no higher than one third in 2006 (see Table 1)6. As small as it is at the
beginning of the period, wage employment is growing rapidly and much to the benefit
of the private sector. The private sector share increased from 10% to 23% of the labor
force (rural and urban taken together) between 1993 and 2002. Public employment
also increased, but at a lower rate, from 8 to 11% of the labor force. In the following
years, public employment share did not decline7.
What we consider here as public employees is a heterogeneous pool of workers, with a
4Some 2004 individual data are hence de facto duplicated. Standard errors account for individual clustering.
5The direction of the bias is ambiguous, since we could be missing both the most fragile and the most suc-
cessful of private sector employees.
6Our definition of labor market participation is restrictive because we focus on the main occupation over the
last 12 months. Gallup (2002) finds 25% in 1998 by including secondary occupations
7This finding is confirmed in the official reports based on 2006 Labor force survey.
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large variation in terms of status and working conditions. A growing majority of them
work in government, education and health services: 51% in 1993, 62% in 2006. The
remaining 49% and 38% are employed by public enterprises. Throughout the 1993-
2006 period, public ownership is present in almost all industries: Electricity and Water
Production, Mining, Food and Beverages, Textile etc. Even when they operate in the
same sector, public firms are larger than private companies: in 1998 public workers in
Paper Metal and Plastic Industries declared having 200 co-workers on average while
private employees declared having only 35.
Over the period, gradual but considerable efforts have been done to reduce over- em-
ployment, increase profitability and harden budget constraints in the public sector. Dur-
ing the 1990s, the number of public enterprises shrank as losses-making firms were
closed or integrated into bigger ensembles, named "General Companies" (see Eglinger
2005). According to 2006 enterprises’ surveys, public firms are more capitalistic and
generate more profits than private domestic firms (Vietnam Socio-Economic Develop-
ment 2008). This may be seen as an achievement of the reforms, but it may also reflect
unequal access to credit on the one hand (see J. Mac Millan and C. Woodruff 1999)
and quasi-monopolistic positions of public firms on the other.
2.3 Public and Private sector earnings distributions
The evolution of public and private sectors’ earnings distributions can be seen on fig-
ure 1: The two distributions followed each other closely in 1993, whereas in 2006, the
public sector earnings distribution clearly dominated the private sector one. In 1993,
private and public employees had the same hourly earnings of 2000 Dongs on average.
In 2006, public employees earned on average 10,000 Dongs, against 6,000 for private
employees. Across time, the private wage distribution became less dispersed around its
mean, whereas the public wage distribution kept the same shape. In a nutshell, within-
sector inequality fell in the private sector, leading to a fall in overall inequality despite
rising between-sectors inequality and constant within-sector inequality in the public
sector (see the Theil decomposition in table 2).
Two statistical artifacts may explain these findings. The sample may be unable to cope
with an increasing mobility of private sector workers (missing the working poor in
urban areas for example). The survey may also be unable to prevent under-reporting
from high-wage private workers. Unfortunately, the lack of any other statistical source
on the period we consider (except for Labour Force Surveys in 2006) prevents us to
check the representativeness of our sample. This limitations will be important while
interpreting changes in workers’ selection.
Our measure of earnings is hourly compensation as declared by the workers them-
selves, and includes wage (in cash and in kind), together with benefits received from
the employer, (in cash and in kind) Being able to include benefits is crucial for our pur-
poses: if we take only wages into account, we do not find any public sector premium in
1998 because all the difference in compensation we observe in Figure 1 is due to more
generous benefits in public enterprises. However the post 1998 evolution is mostly due
to wages, with the difference in benefit provision remaining constant.
Since we consider hourly earnings, the rise in the public-private earnings gap can be
decomposed between two factors First, the public-private difference in the number of
hours worked per year shrank. Private employees used to work 1900 hours per year
in 1993 and public employees 2100 hours; in 2002 both public and private employ-
ees work 2100 hours on average. Second, the difference in yearly earnings increased
steadily over the period. It follows a continuous trend and doubles from 25% in 1993
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to 58% in 2006. Summing these two effects gives us the specific pattern of a moder-
ate increase of the public/private hourly earnings gap from 1993 to 1998, and a much
more substantial increase between 1998 and 2006, because private workers from 2002
onwards work as many hours on average as their public counterparts, but for a much
lower level of yearly compensation.
3 Model
3.1 Motivation
The stylized fact that we have to explain is a decreasing wage inequality combined
with an increase in the public-private gap between the 1990s and the following decade.
In the spirit of the Roy model, a possible explanation would be that workers were
allowed to re-allocate in the sector they wanted, or that employers were able to decide
more freely whom they hired. Heckman Honoré (1990) show that for a log normal
distribution, if workers used to be assigned "randomly" and are now specialized in the
sector in which they have a comparative advantage, inequality should decrease within
each sector and increase between them. The panel structure of our data gives us an
interesting opportunity to take into account the sorting of workers. Our model estimates
different returns to the (unobserved) individual productivity term in each sector. This
structure allows us to gauge at each period the extent to which workers are sorted, i.e.
allocated to the sector where their comparative advantage lies . Since we have two
panels, we can test for a change in workers’ sorting between the two phases of the
transition towards a market economy.
3.2 Model
The structure of our model is the following8. Individual i’s earnings at time t, noted Yit,
depend on four factors: a time effect τt, a time-varying sector effect ηt and θi, which
is an unobserved and time invariant characteristic. Returns to workers’ unobserved
characteristic are normalized to one in the private sector, and are equal to α in the
public sector. Let Pit be a dummy equal to 1 if the individual i is working in the public
sector at time t and it an idiosyncratic shock with zero mean.{
Yit = τt + θi + it if Pit = 0
Yit = τt + ηt + α ∗ θi + it if Pit = 1
(1)
In order to explain wage differentials between the public and the private sector, this
simple setting allows us to capture both the effects of selection (through individual
characteristics θi) and of compensation patterns (captured by the ηt and α). Note that
for identification purposes we have to assume α constant within a panel whereas ηt
varies for each date. But since we have two panels we will estimate different α for
each of them.
Our model also helps uncovering the determinants of between and within-sector wage
inequality for a given distribution of θ. If, on average, public sector workers are more
skilled than private sector employees, a positive ηt will increase between-sector in-
equality (it has no effect on within-sector inequality). This corresponds to the public
sector "wage premium" found in the literature. An α smaller than one implies that
8It is similar to Lemieux(1998) except for the time-varying constant sector premium.
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intra-sector inequality is smaller in the public than in the private sector, because wage
differentials between workers of different skills are compressed in the public sector. If
public sector workers are also more skilled, then an α smaller than one also implies
that the public sector wage setting reduces inter-sector inequality. An α greater than
one would have opposite effects.
3.3 Identification
Within each panel we observe workers at two different dates. We define four groups
of employment history H: some workers stayed in the public sector at both dates
(H=11), some switched to the private sector (H=10), some came from the private sec-
tor (H=01),some stayed in the private sector (H=00). For identification purposes, we
assume that each sector treats movers and stayers the same way at a given date. This
allows us to use information on workers who move between sectors to identify param-
eters that are common to all workers in a given sector (like α for public workers). We
do not assume that the distribution of θi is the same for movers and stayers i.e. that
they are similar in terms of productive characteristics. But conditionally on their indi-
vidual, time invariant characteristic, the two groups’ earnings are the same. Formally
our assumptions writes:
Yit|H ⊥ it
This assumption is similar to the strict exogeneity assumption in other panel models.
But it rules out some plausible mechanisms, for example if the idiosyncratic component
of the wage at time t,it, is systematically lower for workers who will leave one sector
at the period t+1 as compared to those who will stay in the same sector.
Let m00, m01, m10 and m11 denote the mean of θi in the different groups. Since it is
unobserved, we normalize the mean of θ to 0 over the whole population. Identification
relies on eight equations, since we observe the first moments of the four groups at two
different periods:
Y¯t+1|H=11 = τ1 + η1 + α ∗m11 Y¯t|H=11 = τ0 + η0 + α ∗m11
Y¯t+1|H=00 = τ1 +m00 Y¯t|H=00 = τ0 +m00
Y¯t+1|H=01 = τ1 + η1 + α ∗m01 Y¯t|H=01 = τ0 +m01
Y¯t+1|H=10 = τ1 +m10 Y¯t|H=10 = τ0 + η0 + α ∗m10
We have eight equations which allow to identify eight unknown parameters: τ0, τ1,
α, η0,η1, m00, m01 and m10. If piij denotes the weight of each group H = ij, m11 is
then given by:
m11 = −(pi00 ∗m00 + pi01 ∗m01 + pi10 ∗m10) ∗ 1
pi11
It is interesting to note as in Lemieux (1993) that:
α = − (Y¯t+1|H=01 − Y¯t|H=10)− (Y¯t+1|H=11 − Y¯t|H=11)
(Y¯t+1|H=10 − Y¯t|H=01)− (Y¯t+1|H=00 − Y¯t|H=00) (2)
Which is the ratio of the difference in earnings between "movers to public" and "movers
to private" at the time they were in the public sector to the difference in earnings be-
tween "movers to private" and "movers to public" at the time they were in the private
sector. The change in "private stayers"’s earnings is used to deflate private workers
wages in the denominator. The change in "public stayers"’s earnings is used to deflate
public workers wages in the numerator.
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3.4 Specification
While discussing identification, we did not discuss the role of observed characteristics,
such as gender, education or experience in our model. As in every standard panel
data models, the effect of time invariant observable characteristics cannot be identified
separately, unless we have reasons to believe that they are uncorrelated with our index
of unobserved heterogeneity θ. We will not make any orthogonality assumption of
that kind because we are precisely interested in the selection that is correlated with
observable characteristics and which would explain why coefficients on this variables
in OLS may be biased.
As noted by Lemieux (1993), a non parametric solution would consist in estimating
the model for different groups of education and experience. However, given the small
number of observations, we cannot split the sample in as many cells. In the basic
specification, we do not include any observable characteristics:
ln wit = τt + ηt ∗ Pit + (1 + (1− α)Pit) ∗ θi + it for t = 0, 1
In that case, the factor θ sums up all of workers’ heterogeneity between sectors, be it
observable or unobservable and α captures differences in returns to education as well
as returns to experience between the public and the private sector.
Given the well documented fact that male and female earnings are more similar in the
public than in the private sector, it seems crucial to consider gender separately. Since
we cannot assume that gender is orthogonal to the productivity component, it has to be
interacted with the unobserved term as in the following specification:
ln wit = τt + ηt ∗ Pit + (1 + (1− α)Pit) ∗ θi
+ δ0 ∗Gi + δ1 ∗Gi ∗ Pit + γ0 ∗ θi ∗Gi + γ1 ∗ θi ∗Gi ∗ Pit + it
Where Gi is a dummy for being a male worker. In this specification, relative returns to
skills for women are 1 and α in the private and in the public sector respectively. For
men returns to skills write 1 + γ0 and α + γ1 in the private and in the public sector
respectively. The parameters δ0 and δ1 are sector-specific constant shifters between
female and male workers.
3.5 Estimation framework
In order to estimate our model, we restrict ourselves to the sample of workers observed
as working for wage for two consecutive years: 1993 and 1998, 2002 and 2004 or 2004
and 2006. As discussed earlier, VLSS-VHLSS samples are representative of the Viet-
namese population, but contain few wage earners. Our final sample is hence relatively
small, with 1440 individuals in 1993-1998, and 4018 individuals after pooling 2002-
2004 and 2004-2006 surveys (See Table 6). Our model’s identification further relies on
workers who switched between the public and the private sector between the two sur-
veys. There are 261 of workers who switch between 1993 and 1998 and there are 351
in total for the 2002-2006 surveys. The lack of observations exerts severe constraints
on our estimation strategy, because it prevents us from estimating our model separately
for different sub-samples defined by gender, education or experience. On the other
hand it forced us to adopt a simple estimation method, non-linear least squares, which
has better small-sample properties than the GMM used in Lemieux (1998).
Using a dummy variable for each of the four different groups of workers defined ear-
lier as H00 ("private stayers"), H11 ("public stayers"), H01 ("movers to public") and
7
H10 ("movers to private"), the following equation is estimated through non linear least
squares9:
Yit = τt+ηt∗Pit+(1+(1−α)Pit)∗(m00∗H00+m01∗H01+m10∗H10+m11∗H11)+t
Under the normalization constraint:
pi11 ∗m11 + pi00 ∗m00 + pi01 ∗m01 + pi10 ∗m10 = 0
4 Results
The literature on earnings inequality with a model with two sectors (public and private,
formal and informal) is extremely rich and active, with some widely-used techniques,
such as quantile regressions with a sector dummy, or the well-known Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition (Oaxaca (1973)). Before going to the estimation of our model, in this
part we first present and discuss the results that can be obtained through the models that
are more common. This presentation will help us to establish the robustness of some
stylized facts, and to make the case for using a different approach.
4.1 Controlling for workers’ characteristics: "public sector dummy
approach"
Public and private sector workers have very different characteristics, reflecting differ-
ences in the requirement of the jobs offered in the two sectors (see Table 3). As one
would expect, public sector workers have spent more time in school (5 years more in
1993), and are more likely to have received a vocational training (28% more in 1993).
There are also proportionally more female workers in the public sector (12% more)
suggesting that public employment is more "women friendly" than private employ-
ment, in Vietnam (Liu 2005) as in many other countries. Regarding the evolution over
time, it appears that private and public sector workers moved towards convergence in
terms of observable characteristics: the years of education-gap decreased to 3.5 years
in 2006, the difference in the proportion of workers who attained vocational training
went down to 25%. A major exception to this common trend is experience, with public
workers becoming more experienced on average, suggesting that fewer hires happened
after the reform.
In order to compute the public-private wage gap once differences in workers’ charac-
teristics are taken into account, one can simply regress earnings on workers observable
characteristics, with a dummy variable for being in the public sector. This method is not
very informative of the origin of public-private sector differences: it only allows for a
specific intercept in the equation of public sector workers. If one estimates wage equa-
tions at different quantiles however, one can study how coefficients on the public sector
dummy vary across the distribution of earnings. Our quantile regression estimates of
the public sector premium are shown in Figure 2. The public sector premium was es-
sentially zero in 1993 and 1998, and rose steeply afterwards. Most interestingly, in the
years 2000 the public premium became much higher for the top half of the distribution
(more than 30% at all quantiles above the median). Once observable characteristics are
taken into account, it seems that compensation increased in the public sector for the
9The extended model we described before has exactly the same structure, but each variable is interacted with
a dummy for being a male.
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best workers, but less so for workers at the bottom of the distribution.
These findings are coherent with the rise in returns to skills in the public as compared
to the private sector that we document in the next session. We will not pursue the
"public sector dummy approach" however, because it constraints returns on workers’
characteristics to be the same across sectors10.
4.2 Selection on and returns to observable characteristics: Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition
A second approach, which is by far the most common in the literature, consists in
estimating separate wage equations for the private and the public sector: returns to
workers’ observable characteristics are allowed to differ between the two sectors. Re-
sults from the OLS estimation of wage equations in the public and in the private sectors
are shown below (see Table 4). In 1993, the public sector had higher returns to educa-
tion and lower returns to experience than the private sector. Between 1993 and 2006,
returns to education rose and returns to experience declined in both sectors, which is
a common finding in other transition economies. At the end of the period, returns to
education are still higher in the public sector, while returns to experience are almost
comparable in both sectors. This helps to understand why the public-private wage gap
widened, since public workers, who are better educated and more experienced than
their private counterparts saw the returns to their skills improve as compared to the
private sector.
Once returns to skill are estimated separately for each sector, one can use a decompo-
sition similar to Oaxaca (1973) and decompose the public-private sector gap into two
components: the effect of differences in skills on the one hand (selection effect) and the
effect of differences in the returns to these skills on the other (price effect). We build a
counterfactual wage for public employees by applying to their observed characteristics
the coefficient of the wage equation estimated for the private sector. The difference
between the wage observed for public workers and this counterfactual reflects the price
component of the public-private wage gap, because difference in workers character-
istics have been neutralized. We find a substantial price effect for the 1990s, which
is consistent with Bales and Rama (2001). Extending their analysis to the following
years however, we find that this premium rose steeply after 1998, from 20% to 37%
(results of this decomposition are presented in the first rows of Table 6 11. These results
suggest that changes in returns to workers’ characteristics played a role in the rise of
public-private pay differentials.
How insightful as it can be, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method is biased if
there are unobservable characteristics which impact workers’ earnings, and if public
and private sector employees are systematically different with respect to these charac-
teristics12. This motivates the use of our model, because it allows for differences in
workers’ unobserved characteristics, and for differences in returns to these characteris-
tics between the two sectors.
10Note that if one is willing to make this very strict assumption, the method can be made robust to unobserved
heterogeneity using panel models (see Bargain & Melly 2008).
11In order to test for path-dependance, we present under "decomposition 2" the results one obtains from com-
paring private employees earning with the counterfactual wage that they would be paid in the public sector,
given their observable characteristics.
12Albeit more sophisticated, the technique developed by Machado & Mata (2005), which uses sector-specific
quantile regressions to draw counterfactuals suffers from the same bias (for an application to the public-
private sector gap, see Azam & Prakash (2010)).
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4.3 Estimation results
We now turn to the estimation of our model. An intuition of our results can be read from
Table 7, which draws changes over time in average log earnings for the four groups of
workers. Note that changes between 1993 and 1998 happened in five years, whereas
changes in 2002-2006 are all measured on two-year intervals. The latter are hence
smaller. In the 1990s, the group of workers which experienced the highest earnings
gain is the group that joined the private sector (73% increase). In comparison, workers
who joined the public sector only gained 58% between 1993 and 1998. Over the two
panels of the 2002-2006 period, workers joining the public sector gained more (29%)
than those who joined the private sector (19%). Using equation 2, Table 7 suggests
that returns to workers’ skills increased in the public as compared to the private sector
between the periods 1993-1998 and 2002-2006 .
Model estimates obtained by non linear least squares (minimum distance estimation)
are shown in Table 8. Very different patterns emerge for the 1993-1998 and for the
2002-2006 period. In the 1993-1998 panel, the factor loading α on workers’ fixed ef-
fect in the public as compared to the private sector is significantly inferior to 1. In
the 2002-2006 panel, α is not significantly different from 1 and the point estimate is
greater than 1. This suggests that the public sector, which used to offer lower returns
to workers’ skills than the private one, has now adopted compensation patterns that
reward them at least as much as the private sector. Interestingly the point estimate of
ηt are not significantly different from zero and negative for most dates t. The higher
pay in the public sector is not adequately described as a single "wage premium" which
would be unrelated to productive characteristics.
Finally, even if our estimation lacks precision for the first panel, there is clear evidence
of positive selection in the public sector. Indeed, the first moments of the distribution
of θ are negative for employees who stay in or transit through the private sector: our
normalization to zero implies that public sector stayers have on average higher (pos-
itive) values of θ. Our estimation results also indicate a negative selection into the
public sector during the 1990s, with the average of θ among public sector joiners be-
ing significantly less skilled than the average worker (which by normalization has a θ
equal to zero). This negative selection stops in the latter decade, but workers quitting
the public for the private sector have still higher skill levels on average. These findings
could be explained by an improved screening of workers hired in the public sector, and
by a constant flow of skilled workers into the business sector.
As compared to the models presented at the beginning of this part, our model accounts
for a broader range of individual characteristics, both observed and unobserved, which
could explain differences in compensation across sectors. In this sense it allows for a
greater effect of workers’ selection into one sector or another. The fact that we still
find significant differences in relative returns to workers’ comparative advantage be-
tween the public and the private and a significant evolution of these differences over
time makes a strong case for the role of compensation patterns in explaining the rising
public-private wage gap, along with the selection of better workers in the public sector.
In order to assess the respective effect of each factor, in the next section we use our
model estimates to perform inequality decompositions for each period and between
them.
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5 Counterfactual analysis
In this section, we first compute for each worker the value of her unobserved compar-
ative advantage θi. This comparative advantage is constant within each panel (1993-
1998 or 2002-2006). Using the parameters we estimated in the last section, we then
decompose the public-private average wage gap at each period in two components:
a selection and a price effect. Finally, we consider the evolution of wage inequality
from the 1993-1998 panel to the next 2002-2006. This evolution can be explained by
changes in the distribution of workers’ comparative advantage θi and by changes in
relative returns to workers’ comparative advantage α.
5.1 Recovering the distribution of workers’ comparative advan-
tage
If we note Ŷit the earnings predicted by our model for individual i at date t, θi is
estimated using the following expression:
θ̂i =
1
2
(
Yit − Ŷit
1 + (α̂− 1)Pit +
Yit+1 − Ŷit+1
1 + (α̂− 1)Pit+1
)
The distribution of θ in the different employment groups is displayed in the two graphs
3 and 4. Positive selection is evident from the fact that the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity of "public stayers" stands to the right of the distribution of "private stay-
ers". The distributions for the two groups of "sector switchers" lie in-between, because
they have better skills than the average of private employees, and worse than the aver-
age of public employees.
5.2 Explaining the average public-private earnings gap
Our model allows us to decompose the public-private wage gap at each date into two
components. The first is due to differences in workers’ skills between the two sectors
(selection effect), the second is due to the constant earnings difference between public
and private employees, and to difference in returns to productive skills in the two sec-
tors (price effect)13. Using our estimates, we build the predicted distribution of wages
for each panel:
ŷit = τ̂t + η̂t + α̂ ∗ θ̂i if Pit = 1
ŷit = τ̂t + θ̂i if Pit = 0
From comparing each predicted distribution to the real one we obtain residuals ̂it and
then compute two counterfactual distributions. The first counterfactual simulates pub-
lic employees’ wage without the public premium ηt and with returns to characteristics
similar to the private sector. The second simulates private employees’ pay if they were
to receive the public premium and the same returns to their productive skills α as public
employees.
Counterfactual 1 = τ̂t + θ̂i + ̂it for Pit = 1
Counterfactual 2 = τ̂t + η̂t + α̂ ∗ θ̂i + ̂it for Pit = 0
13Although the price effect could be decomposed into two effects: the effect of the constant premium on the
one hand, the effect of relative returns to workers’ comparative advantage on the other, we keep the two
categories to ease the comparison with the results previously obtained with the Oaxaca-Blinder method.
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We first compare public employees’ observed wage to counterfactual 1: this gives us
the pure effect of public-private differences in returns to workers’ skills, because the
workers’ characteristics are held constant (Decomposition 1 in Table 9). Conversely,
Decomposition 2 compares private employees’ observed wage to counterfactual 2. In
line with the rest of the literature, we find that selection on workers’ characteristics,
both observable and unobservable, is a major component of the public-private earn-
ings gap in Vietnam throughout the period. According to the first decomposition, in
1993-1998, positive selection into the public sector accounted for a 50% difference in
public-private earnings, its effect decreased to 35% in 2002-2006.
Along with the effect of selection, our results emphasize the impact of returns to ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics (α) and of the constant premium from being
in the public sector (η) on the public-private sector earnings gap. Both elements had a
negative contribution to the public-private gap in 1993-1998: it means that inequality
would have increased in the 1990s, would the public sector pay its workers the same as
the private sector. In 2002-2006, their contribution has turned into a positive one. The
subsequent reform in public sector’s compensation pattern unambiguously widened the
public-private wage gap.
5.3 Explaining changes in overall wage inequality
We now turn to the broader question of how public-private differences and their change
over time impacted the overall distribution of earnings. To simplify, we will focus
only on the first and last dates for which we have data, 1993 and 2006. We will note
respectively τ93, η93, α93 and τ06, η06, α06 the constant, the public premium and
the price factor on individual characteristics previously estimated for each date in their
respective panel. P 93i and P
06
i are dummies for being in the public sector at each
date. Predicted distributions and residuals are obtained as before, with residuals now
noted 93i and 
06
i1 . Finally we simulate changes in the distribution of θ through a rank-
preserving transformation, that is we assign to each 1993 (respectively 2006) individual
the value of θ that has the same rank in 2006 (respectively 1993) distribution as the
value of θ that we estimated for her in 1993 (respectively 2006) distribution. We note
these values respectively θ93i and θ
06
i .
We now have all ingredients to build the three following counterfactuals14:
Log wage in 1993 = τ̂93 + (1 + (α̂93 − 1) ∗ P 93i ) ∗ θ̂i + η̂93 ∗ P 93i + ̂93i
Counterfactual 1 = τ̂06 + (1 + (α̂93 − 1) ∗ P 93i ) ∗ θ̂i + η̂93 ∗ P 93i + ̂93i
Counterfactual 2 = τ̂06 + (1 + (α̂93 − 1) ∗ P 93i ) ∗ θ̂06i + η̂93 ∗ P 93i + ̂93i
Counterfactual 3 = τ̂06 + (1 + (α̂06 − 1) ∗ P 93i ) ∗ θ̂06i + η̂06 ∗ P 93i + ̂93i
Log wage in 2006 = τ̂06 + (1 + (α̂06 − 1) ∗ P 06i ) ∗ θ̂i + η̂06 ∗ P 06i + ̂06i
The first counterfactual adds to wages in 1993 the average increase in wages between
1993 and 2006. Under the fundamental assumption that the rank in the distribution
of θ adequately describes each individual characteristics, the second counterfactual es-
timates how the 1993 employees, with 2006 employees characteristics, would have
been paid if the allocation process and the difference in compensation patterns had not
changed between the public and the private sectors. The third one further changes both
14We also built the 3 symmetric counterfactuals, using the distribution of wages in 2006 as a starting point.
With the order of decomposition, our results do change quantitatively but not qualitatively.
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the constant premium and the price of individual characteristics in the public sector as
compared to the private sector. All three counterfactuals, with the real distributions for
1993 and 2006 are drawn in Figure 5 and 6.
Starting from the real 1993 earnings distribution, the change in the constant τ shifts the
curve to the right (Counterfactual 1). Our decomposition show that changes in compen-
sation patterns in the public sector as compared to the public sector had an inequality
increasing effect (Counterfactual 2). But this effect is offset by a shrinking dispersion
of individual characteristics, which explains why the 2006 distribution looks so simi-
lar to the 1993 distribution (Counterfactual 3). If we compare this last counterfactual
with the real distribution for 2006 individuals, we see at least two important reasons for
which they could differ. First, if the allocation process between the public and the pri-
vate sector conditional on individual characteristics has changed over time. Second, if
the distribution of exogenous shocks is not the same for the two periods. Interestingly,
these two factors taken together do not seem to explain a large public-private gap.
5.4 Discussion and extension
Our model confirms and elaborate on the results drawn with the Oaxaca-Blinder method
described in Section 4.2: selection on workers’ characteristics is important but returns
to skills are the driving factor behind the widening public-private earnings gap. The
value added by our model is that it offers a much more comprehensive view of selec-
tion on workers’ characteristics, and hence strengthens the case against it playing a
major role in the evolution observed throughout the 1993-2006 period. The fact that
α is significantly inferior to 1 in the first panel suggests that neither a simple wage
equation model nor a more elaborated random effect model (which de facto assumes
constant returns to unobserved characteristics across sectors) could adequately describe
differences in returns to workers’ skills between the public and the private sector.
A potential threat to our conclusions is selective attrition. If the most productive work-
ers in the private sector dropped out of the panel in the 2002-2006 period, we would
be underestimating the average and the dispersion of private sector earnings. In order
to affect the results we draw by comparing the 1993-1998 period to the 2002-2006 pe-
riod, however, the attrition would have to be present in the latter but not in the former
panel. Since the panel and the cross-sectional sample have similar earnings distribution
at each date, the data we dispose of do not support this argument. It is still possible that
the cross-sectional sample itself is biased. Unfortunately, we do not have any means
to gauge how biased the 1993-1998 sample is, because there is no other data source on
wages during this period that we could use for comparison purposes.
Another shortcoming of our method lies in the fact that the effect of observed charac-
teristics such as education, experience and gender is subsumed under a single index.
Table 10 shows correlation coefficients between the estimated θi and individual charac-
teristics. The highest coefficient is for years of schooling, followed by residence (urban
or rural), and experience. This reinforces the intuition that our method is capturing the
observable characteristics one usually includes in earnings models together with some
unobservable characteristics that are strongly correlated with them. These unobserved
factors contributing to workers’s comparative advantage could include cognitive abili-
ties, social capital or political connections.
Out of all observable characteristics, gender may play a particular role in the evolution
of wage inequality during the transition. As noted earlier, the public sector discrimi-
nates less against women than the private sector. This phenomenon may interfere with
the increase of returns to workers’ skill in the public sector relatively to the private
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sector that we established before. Following the specification described in section 3.4,
we estimate our model with different coefficients for female and male workers. As
expected, the estimated increase in returns to skills in the public sector is higher than in
the first specification: relative returns to female workers’ skills rose dramatically from
.38 to 2.1 (see Table 11). The increase for men has been more moderate (as the negative
coefficient on γ1 shows). Even though the lack of precision is more acute, these results
seem to confirm the mechanisms explained above.
6 Conclusion
In order to explain differences in earnings between the public and the private sectors,
the two usual candidates are differences in workers’ skills and differences in returns
to workers’ skills in the two sectors. The two factors have very different interpre-
tations, and a considerable amount of research has been devoted to disentangle the
former, which suggests sorting by abilities, from the latter, which gives evidence of
labor market segmentation. A plausible explanation of the rising public-private wage
gap between 1993 and 2006 was that selection into this public sector had increased,
with a greater flexibility in hiring and firing workers in the public sector. However,
using a model of comparative advantage and differential returns between the two sec-
tors, we found that sorting seemed to decrease between the first and the second period.
Workers became more homogeneous across sectors. In order to explain the increased
between-sector inequality, we showed that, in the first period, workers with a compar-
ative advantage in the public sector were paid less (with respect to their skills) in the
public than in the private sector. This is coherent with the existence of an institutional
preference for low wage inequality in the public sector, similar to the unionized sector
studied by Lemieux (1998). It could also be linked to the existence of (to the econo-
metrician) unobserved benefits from being in the public sector, such as job stability or
social influence, or unobserved costs of joining that sector, such as passing the exami-
nation or having personal connections with the administration. In the second period, on
the opposite, workers with a comparative advantage to be in the public sector were in-
deed earning higher returns in the public than in the private sector. It seems a common
feature of the transition to market economies that workers’ compensation became more
closely related to their productivity in each sector (see Keane and Prasad 2006). Un-
like the "sorting scenario", our explanation does not imply that a massive reallocation
of workers happened between the 1990s and the 2000s, and anecdotal evidence suggest
that it did not. It involves a policy change in the public sector, with more productive
workers receiving higher benefits. This change could be explained by pure economic
considerations, such as the need for the public sector to retain its workers, or it could
be due to the political economy of the reform process, which needed a strong support
from State employees. Finally, further research is needed to understand how the distri-
bution of workers’ productive skills became more homogeneous, leading to an overall
decrease in wage inequality. It could be simply due to the lack of representativeness
of the sample we use: unregistered migrants are not covered by the VHLSS-VLSS
survey. More interestingly, it may be explained by increased selection of workers into
the labor market, with a better sorting on ability between self-employment and wage
work. Alternatively, it could be a positive feature of Vietnam’s transition towards mar-
ket economy that the increasing valuation of skills by employers was accompanied by
an improvement and homogenization of workers skills.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Employment sector of the main occupation for working adults
Urban Rural
1993 2006 1993 2006
Public employment 20.71% 23.23% 3.54% 6.28%
Private employment 8% 20.45% 20.06% 29.94%
Self-employed 88.24% 73.27% 59.22% 46.83%
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS data 1993 and VHLSS 2006.
Table 2: Theil 1 Entropy index
1993 1998 2004 2006
Within public 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.20
Within private 0.31 0.24 0.22 0.20
Within sectors 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.20
Between sectors 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03
Total 0.29 0.24 0.28 0.23
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS data 1993 and VHLSS 2006.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on public and private sector workers
1993 2006
Public Private Diff Public Private Diff
Years of schooling 10.77 5.87 4.91 11.02 7.54 3.48
(3.42) (3.62) *** (2.01) (3.48) ***
Years of experience 14.76 15.29 -0.53 19.84 17.62 2.23
(9.02) (12.31) (12.31) (13.04) ***
Male worker 0.50 0.61 -0.11 0.56 0.63 -0.07
(0.50) (0.50) *** (0.50) (0.48) ***
Vocational training 0.32 0.04 0.28 0.37 0.12 0.25
(0.47) (0.20) *** (0.48) (0.32) ***
Number of workers 881 1401 2387 5227
Source: OLS estimates on VLSS 1993, 1998, VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006 surveys data. Standard
deviation in parentheses. Stars denote significance levels of differences in means: *** for 1%
significance level, ** for 5% and * for 10%.
Table 4: Wage equations in the public and private sector in 1993 and 2006
Private sector 1993 2006
Coefficient s.d. Signif. Coefficient s.d Signif.
Years of Schooling 0.021 0.010 ** 0.046 0.005 ***
Years of Experience 0.046 0.009 *** 0.024 0.004 ***
Experience square -0.103 0.019 *** -0.001 0.000 ***
Male 0.274 0.067 *** 0.213 0.030 ***
Vocational training -0.200 0.135 0.190 0.051 ***
South 0.440 0.082 *** 0.117 0.031 ***
Urban area 0.099 0.064 0.011 0.030
Observations 438 1213
Public sector 1993 2006
Coefficient s.d. Signif. Coefficient s.d. Signif.
Years of Schooling 0.040 0.009 *** 0.067 0.010 ***
Years of Experience 0.024 0.011 ** 0.022 0.006 ***
Experience square -0.032 0.030 0.000 0.000
Male 0.091 0.059 -0.018 0.044
Vocational training 0.007 0.062 -0.061 0.070
South 0.289 0.059 *** 0.130 0.044 ***
Urban area 0.044 0.059 0.099 0.044 **
Observations 397 806
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS 1993, 1998, VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006 surveys data. Stars
denote significance levels for t-test of mean equality between the public and the private sector: *** for 1%
significance level, ** for 5% and * for 10%.
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Table 5: Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the public-private wage gap
1993 1998 2002 2006 1993-2006
Real Gap 0.16 0.23 0.44 0.51 0.35
Decomposition 1
Price effect 0.20 0.19 0.27 0.37 0.17
Selection -0.06 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.20
Decomposition 2
Price effect 0.01 -0.15 0.16 0.25 0.25
Selection 0.14 0.37 0.31 0.25 0.12
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS 1993, 1998 VHLSS 2002 2004 2006.
Table 6: Panel sample broken down by employment history
1993-1998 2002-2006
Number Percent Number Percent
Private stayers 778 54.03 2,478 61.67
Movers to Public 210 14.58 236 5.87
Movers to Private 51 3.54 115 2.86
Public stayers 401 27.85 1,189 29.59
Total 1,440 100 4,018 100
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS 1993, 1998 VHLSS 2002 2004
2006.
Table 7: Employment history and earnings gains
1993-1998 2002-2006
t t+1 Change t t+1 Change
Private stayers 0,41 0,86 0,45 1,14 1,39 0,25
(0,66) (0,55) (0,60) (0,54)
Movers to Public 0,13 0,71 0,58 1,18 1,47 0,29
(0,65) (0,56) ( 0,80 ) (0,82)
Movers to Private 0,37 1,10 0,73 1,43 1,62 0,19
(0,81) (0,59 ) (0,73) (0,67)
Public stayers 0,55 1,13 0,58 1,62 1,96 0,34
(0,60) (0,60) (0,66) (0,65 )
Total 0,46 1,00 0,54 1,34 1,62 0,28
(0,65) (0,60) (0,68) (0,66)
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS 1993, 1998 VHLSS 2002 2004 2006. Average Log
hourly earnings (Standard errors in parentheses). In the 2002-2006 part of the table, the t
column refers to 2002 for 2002-2004 panel individuals, and to 2004 for 2004-2006 panel
individuals.
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Table 8: Non linear least square estimation results
1993-1998 2002-2006
Estimate s. d. Sign. Estimate s. d. Sign.
Factor α 0.454 0.272 * 1.584 0.902 *
Movers to public m01 -0.462 0.163 *** -0.075 0.087
Movers to private m10 0.058 0.121 0.112 0.036 ***
Private stayers m00 -0.177 0.127 -0.115 0.039 ***
Time 0 dummy τ0 0.592 0.133 *** 1.253 0.043 ***
Time 1 dummy τ1 1.040 0.126 *** 1.503 0.039 ***
Public premium at time 0 η0 -0.118 0.158 0.083 0.087
Public premium at time 1 η1 -0.251 0.153 -0.005 0.087
Sample size 1700 6156
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS 1993, 1998 VHLSS 2002 2004 2006. Stars are used to denote
significance levels: *** for 1% significance level, ** for 5% and * for 10%.
Table 9: Decomposition of the public private wage gap based on our simulations
1993 1998 2002 2006 1993-2006
Real Gap 0.16 0.19 0.47 0.53 0.37
Decomposition 1
Price effect -0.48 -0.32 0.10 0.18 0.66
Selection 0.64 0.51 0.37 0.35 -0.29
Decomposition 2
Price effect -0.13 -0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.16
Selection 0.29 0.23 0.53 0.50 0.21
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS 1993, 1998 VHLSS 2002 2004 2006.
Table 10: Correlation of the estimated individual fixed effect θi with observable
characteristics
1993 -1998 2002-2006
Male worker 0.0897*** 0.0958***
Years of schooling 0.3464*** 0.3993***
Years of experience 0.1227*** 0.0769***
Urban 0.1814*** 0.2501***
Vocational training 0.076*** 0.1611***
South 0.0626*** -0.0168
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS 1993, 1998
VHLSS 2002 2004 2006.
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Table 11: Extended model with gender as an explanatory variable
1993 2006
Coef. Std. Err. Sign. Coef. Std. Err. Sign.
Factor α 0.389 0.328 2.113 0.911 **
Movers to public m01 -0.663 0.385 * -0.103 0.083
Movers to private m10 -0.118 0.322 0.102 0.042 **
Private stayers m00 -0.379 0.320 -0.193 0.053 ***
Time 0 dummy τ0 0.589 0.328 * 1.169 0.055 ***
Time 1 dummy τ1 1.037 0.324 *** 1.411 0.052 ***
Public premium at time 0 η0 -0.128 0.341 0.001 0.121
Public premium at time 1 η1 -0.260 0.335 -0.079 0.121
Male premium (private) δ0 0.337 0.121 *** 0.220 0.056 ***
Male premium (private) δ1 0.142 0.093 0.306 0.105 ***
Male difference in returns (private) γ0 0.114 0.298 -0.258 0.264
Male difference in returns (public) γ1 -0.054 0.209 -1.161 0.608 *
Sample size 1700 6156
Source: Author’s calculations on VLSS 1993, 1998 VHLSS 2002 2004 2006.
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Figure 1: Changes in the distribution of log hourly earnings in the public and private
sectors between 1993 and 2006 (Kernel estimates)
Figure 2: Public premium estimated in a wage equation for different earnings quantiles
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Figure 3: Distribution of unobserved heterogeneity for the 4 employment groups in
1993-1998
Figure 4: Distribution of unobserved heterogeneity for the 4 employment groups in
2002-2006
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Figure 5: Whole distribution of wages in 1993 and 2006, with two counterfactuals
Figure 6: Whole distribution of wages in 1993 and 2006, with two counterfactuals
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